Kenneth W. Larsen v. Allstate Insurance co., et al. : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Kenneth W. Larsen v. Allstate Insurance co., et al. :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael P. Zaccheo; Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Attorneys for Appellee.
Brent O. Hatch; Mark F. James; Kimball, Parr, Waddoups, Brown & Gee; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Larsen v. Allstate Insurance, No. 920334 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3262
UTAH COURT OF APPfcALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
A10 
"DOCKET NO. tzoKfc* 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KENNETH W. LARSEN, 
* 
Plaintiff and Appellant, * Court of Appeals No. 920068CA 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., * + Cm \ J ^ ^ "t 
et al., * 
* Priority No. 16 
Defendant and Appellee. * 
* 
&% t 
ull 
Burnt OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO. 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S/APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
District Court Civil No. 91090421 CV 
HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Brent O. Hatch (5715) 
Mark F. James (5295) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN 
& GEE 
185 South State Street, 
Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Kenneth W. Larsen 
Michael P. Zaccheo (4450) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON 
50 South Main, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-
2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Allstate Insurance Co. 
FILED 
JUN 2 9 1992 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KENNETH W. LARSEN, * 
* 
Plaintiff and Appellant, * 
vs. * 
* 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., * 
et al., * 
* 
Defendant and Appellee. * 
Court of Appeals No. 920068CA 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO. 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S/APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
District Court Civil No. 91090421 CV 
HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Brent O. Hatch (5715) 
Mark F. James (5295) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN 
& GEE 
185 South State Street, 
Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Michael P. Zaccheo (4450) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON 
50 South Main, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-
2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Kenneth W. Larsen 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Allstate Insurance Co. 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
IN THE COURT WHOSE JUDGMENT 
IS SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED 
1. Kenneth W. Larsen, plaintiff (appellant herein). 
2. Curtis L. Porter, defendant (not a party to this 
appeal). 
3. Levonne R. Edwards, defendant (not a party to this 
appeal). 
4. Allstate Insurance Co., defendant (appellee 
herein). 
5. John Does 1 through 5, defendants (not parties to 
this appeal). 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
Nature of the case 3 
Course of proceedings/disposition in the court below. . 3 
Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review. . . . 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 7 
A. The no-fault benefits issue. 7 
B. The good-faith issue 9 
ARGUMENT 10 
POINT I 
CONSISTENT WITH THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE NO-FAULT 
ACT, THE LANGUAGE OF THE NO-FAULT ACT, THE LANGUAGE OF 
ALLSTATE'S INSURANCE POLICY, AND TO EFFECTUATE THE 
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS, THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED 10 
A. History/purpose/traditional interpretive guidelines of 
the Utah No-Fault Act 11 
B. The language of the Act 14 
C. The interpretation urged by Allstate is most consistent 
with the purpose of the Act 17 
D. Allstate's policy language 25 
ii 
POINT II 
ALLSTATE'S POSITION IS "FAIRLY DEBATABLE" AND THEREFORE 
CANNOT SUPPORT AN ACTION FOR BAD FAITH 28 
CONCLUSION 31 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Belcher v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 293 N.W.2d 594, 601 
(Mich. 1980) 11, 12 
Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Company, 745 P.2d 838, 842 
(Utah App. 1987) 29 
Crieg v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurcince Company, 686 
P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1984) 13, 23, 24 
DeFelice Industries Inc. v. Harris, 573 S.2d 643 (La. App. 
1991) 31 
Farmers Insurance Company v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 619 
P.2d 329, 333 (Utah 1980) 11, 25 
Fleming v. Allstate Insurance Company, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 831, 832 
(1980) 13 
Glenn v. Farmers and Merchants Insurance Company, 649 F. Supp. 
1447 (W.D. of Ark. 1986) 13, 22, 23 
Hill v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 183 Utah Adv. Rptr. 
70, 73 (Utah App. March 27, 1992) 28 
Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244, 248 (Utah App. 1987) cert, denied 
765 P.2d 1277 30, 31 
Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Insurance Company, 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 
1977) 12, 17, 18 
Jones v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 
1979) 12, 17, 18 
Koulis v. Standard Oil, 746 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah. App. 1987) 25 
Little v. Pepsi-Cola Company, 656 P.2d 786 (Kan. App. 1983) . 12 
Ohio Casualty and Surety Company v. Continental Insurance 
Company, 421 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1979) 12 
iv 
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042, 1043 
(Utah 1987) 11, 25 
Tanner v. Phoenix Insurance Company, 799 P.2d 231 (Utah App. 
1990) 13, 17-19 
Western Casualty and Surety Company v. Marchant, 615 P. 2d 423, 
427 (Utah 1980) 28 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-301 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307 2, 4, 14, 28 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 2, 9, 20, 30 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1992) 1 
Rules 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1 
Treatises and Other Authorities 
Couch on Insurance, 2d, Section 45:664 12 
J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Volume 8d, Section 5151 
et seq. "History of No-Fault Legislation" at pages 372-373 
(1981) 12 
Long, The Law of Liability Insurance, Volume 4, Section 27.04, 
page 47 (rev. 291) 12 
v 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to consider this 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(1992) and Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Based on the record before it, did the district 
court err by deciding that an applicant for Utah NO-Fault wage 
loss benefits is entitled to receive those benefits for 52 
consecutive weeks following the date of the applicant's injury 
rather than a 52 week period commencing when benefits are first 
requested? 
Regarding this issue, the Utah Court of Appeals should 
review the district court's decision for legal correctness. 
2. Based upon the record before it, which included 
uncontested expert affidavits, did the district court err by 
deciding that as a matter of law Allstate Insurance Company had 
not breached its duty of good faith to its insured Kenneth 
Larsen? 
With regard to this issue, the Utah Court of Appeals 
should review the district courts decision for legal 
correctness. 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ETC, 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(1)(b)(i): 
Personal Injury Protection coverages and 
benefits include: the lesser of $250 per week 
or 85% of any loss of gross income and loss 
of earning capacity per person from inability 
to work, for a maximum of 52 consecutive 
weeks after the loss, except that this 
benefit need not be paid for the first three 
days of disability unless the disability 
continues for longer than two consecutive 
weeks after the date of injury. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5): 
Payment of the benefits provided for in 
Section 31A-22-307 shall be made on a monthly 
basis as expenses are incurred. . . . If 
the insurer fails to pay the expenses when 
due, these expenses shall bear interest at 
the rate of 1%% per month after the due date. 
The person entitled to the benefits may bring 
an action in contract to recover the expenses 
plus the applicable interest. If the insurer 
is required by the action to pay any overdue 
benefits and interest, the insurer is also 
required to pay reasonable attorneys7 fee to 
the claimant. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case. 
On or about July 2, 1991, plaintiff Kenneth Larsen 
commenced this action in the Utah District Court for the district 
of Salt Lake County by filing a Complaint against Curtis L. 
Porter, Levonne R. Edwards, Allstate Insurance Company, and John 
Does 1 through 5. (R. 00002-00009.) Mr. Larsen alleged that he 
was involved in an automobile accident on or about October 26, 
1989, and that as a result of the negligence of defendants Porter 
and Edwards suffered injuries in the accident. Plaintiff sought 
compensation in the form of special and general damages from 
defendants Edwards and Porter. (Id.) 
Plaintiff also alleged that his insurer, Allstate 
Insurance Company had wrongfully denied him certain Utah No-Fault 
Benefits and in doing so had breached its duty of good faith. 
Larsen sought recovery of the benefits allegedly due and damages 
arising from the alleged breach of the duty of good faith. (Id.) 
Course of proceedings/disposition in the court below. 
In lieu of an Answer to Larsen's Complaint, Allstate 
Insurance Co. filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Allstate argued that under Utah law 
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and the provisions of its insurance contract with Mr. Larsen, it 
had already paid all wage loss benefits due. Allstate also 
argued that because its actions were appropriate, and because an 
exclusive statutory remedy in derogation of common law remedies 
exists in the event benefits are wrongfully denied, Larsen had 
failed to state a cause of action with regard to his alleged bad 
faith claim. (R. 00003-00074.) After briefing and oral 
argument, on November 8, 1991, the district court, Honorable 
Richard H. Moffat presiding, granted Allstate's Motion to Dismiss 
or in the alternative Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 00119, 
the Minute Entry; R. 00120-00121, the Order.). The judgment was 
certified as final and this interlocutory appeal followed. 
Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review. 
1. Commencing in September of 1989, and continuing 
thereafter at all times relevant to this appeal, Kenneth Larsen 
and the Allstate Insurance Co. were bound by the terms of a 
automobile insurance contract, policy no. 020813344. With regard 
to personal injury protection wage loss benefits,1 the policy 
provided at page 11 that whenever an injured person entitled to 
coverage incurred bodily injury caused by an automobile accident 
1
 Wage loss benefits are a mandatory part of every Utah auto 
liability policy pursuant to the Utah No-Fault Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-307(l)(b)(i). 
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that person would be entitled to certain wage loss benefits under 
the following terms: 
Allstate will pay to or on behalf of an 
injured person the following benefits . . .: 
(2) Work Loss 
Loss of income and loss of earning capacity by the 
injured person during his lifetime from inability to 
work during a period commencing three days after the 
date of bodily injury and continuing for a maximum of 
52 consecutive weeks. (Emphasis in original.) 
(R. 00058, page 11 of the insurance policy, see also, R. 00050-
00052, uncontested affidavit of Allstate employee Louise Redmond 
establishing that the policy quoted from was in fact the 
appropriate, applicable policy; R. 00006, paragraph 30 of 
plaintiff's Complaint.) 
2. On October 26, 1989, Kenneth Larsen sustained 
bodily injury in an automobile accident. (R. 0003, paragraph 9 
of Larsen7s Complaint; R. 0004, paragraph 16 of Larsen's 
Complaint; see also, R.00070, a letter from Mr. Larsen's treating 
physician Gordon R. Kimball, M.D., which states in pertinent 
part: "This patient was involved in a motor vehicle accident on 
10/26/89 when he was rear ended and sandwiched between two cars. 
The patient injured his spine at that time . . . " (Emphasis 
added.)) 
No evidence was submitted to the district court, nor 
does any evidence appear in the record of this case indicating 
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that Mr. Larsen sustained his bodily injury at any time other 
than October 26, 1989. 
3. On May 26, 1990, Mr. Larsen requested wage loss 
benefits from Allstate Insurance Company pursuant to the personal 
injury protection coverage of his policy and in response Allstate 
paid wage loss benefits from May 26, 1990 to and including 
October 25, 1990. The total amount paid was $5r500. (R. 00051, 
paragraph 4 of the uncontested affidavit of Allstate employee 
Louise Redmond.) 
4. On the advice of counsel and pursuant to its 
internal investigation, Allstate Insurance Company determined 
that Mr. Larsen was entitled to wage loss benefits commencing on 
the date of the accident/injury and ending 52 consecutive weeks 
thereafter. Therefore, Mr. Larsen was paid wage loss benefits 
from the date he requested such benefits to a date 52 weeks 
following the date of the accident. (R. 00051, paragraph 5, of 
the uncontested affidavit of Allstate employee Louise Redmond.) 
5. At Count III of Larsen's Complaint he asserted 
that Allstate should have paid wage loss benefits for 52 
consecutive weeks commencing on the date plaintiff first 
submitted a demand for wage loss benefits, rather than 52 
consecutive weeks from the date of the accident and/or injury. 
(R. 0006-0007.) 
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6. Under Count IV of Larsen's Complaint, he alleged 
that Allstate's decision to pay work loss benefits for 52 
consecutive weeks after the date of injury, instead of after the 
date demand was made was a breach of its duty of good faith. (R. 
0007-0008.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. The no-fault benefits issue. 
No-fault legislation, including Utah/s No-Fault Act, is 
designed to provide a quick, definite, but limited source of 
funds on a no-fault basis to persons injured in automobile 
accidents. Utah appellate courts have consistently refused to 
accept arguments that would expand benefits beyond those which 
are specifically mandated by statute or that render benefits paid 
under the Act generally less predictable, less definite, and less 
precise or less efficient and more costly to administer. Utah's 
courts have also rejected arguments that would lead in any way to 
an erosion of the Act's fundamental purpose of providing quick, 
definite, but limited benefits to injured persons. The Act was 
never intended as a substitute for an individual's right to 
recover compensation from an at-fault tort feasor. Consistent 
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with those principles, Allstate urges this court to adopt a wage 
loss benefit requirement that comports with: 
1. The No-Fault Act's language which requires that 
benefits be paid 52 weeks after the loss and which, when read as 
a whole, equates the date of loss with the date of the accident. 
Courts from other jurisdictions have unanimously so held, 
2. The stated purpose of the Act, which is to provide 
quick definite benefits to the insured, not as cippellant argues, 
an open-ended entitlement which may long surpass the claimant's 
immediate needs and which may require payment of benefits 10, 20, 
or 40 years after the accident. Such a perpetual liability would 
make it impossible to adequately investigate the claimant's 
entitlement to benefits and would be very costly to administer, 
3. Allstate's policy language which requires benefits 
to be paid for 52 consecutive weeks after the date of bodily 
injury, not, as appellant urges, beginning on an indefinite date 
when claimant first takes off work which may be years after the 
date of the accident. Such a result would require insurance 
companies to maintain loss reserves for every injured insured 
indefinitely. 
Although appellant's tortured reasoning would most 
certainly result in greater benefits to injured parties, it would 
do so at the expense of the fundamental purpose of the Utah No-
8 
Fault Act, and would be contrary to the provisions of the 
contract of insurance freely entered between Allstate and Mr. 
Larsen. The district court understood that and ruled 
accordingly. That ruling should be affirmed. 
B. The good-faith issue. 
Where there is a fairly debatable reason for an 
insurer's conduct or decision, that insurer cannot be said to 
have breached its duty of good faith. In this case, should the 
Court of Appeals agree with Allstate, then obviously Allstate's 
decision to pay benefits under its interpretation of the law and 
its policy was not only fairly debatable, but was also correct. 
On the other hand, if the Court of Appeals disagrees, then the 
fact that the district court agreed with Allstate is 
incontrovertible evidence that Allstate's position was at least 
fairly debatable. Furthermore, Allstate relied on the opinion of 
its attorney. An opinion that was set forth in an uncontested 
affidavit submitted to the trial court. As such Allstate met its 
duty of good faith. 
Additionally, Utah law provides an exclusive statutory 
remedy in the event an insurer fails to pay appropriate no-fault 
benefits. Under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5) if an insurer 
fails to pay benefits when due, the claimant may bring an action 
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to recover those benefits and if successful, interest at the rate 
of 1%% per month will be paid along with reasonsible attorneys7 
fees. Damages for mental pain and suffering such as sought by 
appellant here are not provided for. That remedial statute is in 
derogation of the common law remedy and precludes the common law 
remedy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CONSISTENT WITH THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE 
OP THE NO-FAULT ACT, THE LANGUAGE OP THE 
NO-FAULT ACT, THE LANGUAGE OF ALLSTATE'S 
INSURANCE POLICY, AND TO EFFECTUATE THE 
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF NO-FAULT 
BENEFITS, THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
Allstate submits that this court, just as the trial 
court, should determine the duration of the insured's wage loss 
benefits under the Utah No-Fault Act by first looking to the 
purpose of the Act, then by interpreting the language of the Act 
in light of that purpose (including reference to case law from 
other jurisdictions in which this precise issue has been 
addressed), and then, if there is some doubt as to the 
10 
interpretation of the Act, by reference to the Allstate insurance 
policy.2 
Therefore, the history and purpose of legislative no-
fault schemes in general and Utah's No-Fault Act specifically, 
then the language of the Utah No-Fault Act, and then the language 
of Allstate's policy are each addressed in turn hereafter. Then 
the reasons why the trial court's decision, rather than 
appellant's position, is most appropriate are set forth. 
A. History/purpose/traditional interpretive guidelines of 
the Utah No-Fault Act. 
No-fault legislation now exists in a majority of states 
to provide a quick, no nonsense, no frills way to provide 
immediate funds to those injured in automobile accidents without 
regard to who or what may have been responsible for the injuries. 
Belcher v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 293 N.W.2d 594, 601 
(Mich. 1980). No-Fault Acts are not designed to provide 
compensation for all economic losses suffered, but merely provide 
an immediate source of funds while the injured party convalesces 
2
 Allstate concedes that it may not decrease by its policy 
language the minimum benefits required by the Utah No-Fault Act. 
However, where the No-Fault Act does not mandate a certain level or 
duration of benefits, then the parties may contract for whatever 
duration of benefits they desire. See, Farmers Insurance Company 
v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 619 P.2d 329, 333 (Utah 1980); 
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042, 1043 
(Utah 1987). 
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or until an appropriate claim for full compensation is pursued. 
Id.; Long, The Law of Liability Insurance. Volume 4, Section 
27.04, page 47 (rev. 291); Little v. Pepsi-Cola Company, 656 P.2d 
786 (Kan. App. 1983); Ohio Casualty and Surety Company v. 
Continental Insurance Company, 421 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1979); Couch on 
Insurance. 2d, Section 45:664. It was the uncertainty in the 
levels of compensation and the delay in compensation which led to 
the enactment of no-fault legislation in the first place. J. 
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice. Volume 8d, Section 5151 et 
seq. "History of No-Fault Legislation" at pages 372-373 (1981). 
Utah courts have consistently interpreted the Utah No-
Fault Act to provide for the least amount of controversy, the 
most amount of certainty, and the most efficiency in spite of the 
fact that such interpretations at times result in lower benefits 
for injured parties. See, Jones v. Transamerica Insurance 
Company, 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979) (the claimant's argument that 
the insurer failed to pay disability benefits under the No-Fault 
Act and by so doing breached its duty of good faith was not 
accepted by the court in favor of a more narrow definition of 
disability); Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Insurance Company, 559 
P.2d 958 (Utah 1977) (the Court refused to expand the nature of 
household services benefits provided by the No-Fault Act); see 
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also, Tanner v. Phoenix Insurance Company, 799 P.2d 231 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
That approach is consistent with other jurisdictions. 
Specifically, courts have refused to adopt the approach urged by 
appellant in this case and have instead adopted Allstate's 
position. See, Glenn v. Farmers and Merchants Insurance Company, 
649 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D. of Ark. 1986); Crieg v. Prudential 
Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 686 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 
1984). Although the details of those two cases will be discussed 
further herein infra, the point is that courts and commentators 
have consistently viewed no-fault legislation as a means to 
provide limited benefits, for a limited period of time, to those 
injured in automobile accidents and have consistently rejected 
arguments that seek to expand benefits at the expense of 
efficiency and certainty. See also, Fleming v. Allstate 
Insurance Company, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 831, 832 (1980) (the court noted 
that no-fault legislation: "Should not be so twisted and 
extended as to confer on an injured party a benefit not intended 
by the legislature." (citations omitted)). 
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B. The language of the Act, 
Beginning at Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(1)(a) and 
continuing through subparagraph (d) the Utah No-Fault Act defines 
the minimum personal injury protection coverages and benefits 
that must be included in all Utah automobile liability insurance 
policies. In general terms the Act mandates medical expense 
reimbursement benefits, wage loss benefits, household service 
benefits, and death benefits. Both the wage loss benefits and 
the household services benefits are limited in amount and 
duration, while the medical expense benefits and death benefits 
are limited in amount only. Id. at (a)-(d). The Act,s 
definition section offers no assistance regarding the operative 
words at issue here. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-301(l)-(7). 
Under the Act, with regard to wage loss benefits, an 
insured is entitled to: "the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of 
any loss of gross income and loss of earning capacity per person 
from inability to work". Such payments are limited in duration 
to: "A maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the loss, except 
that benefits need not be paid for the first three days of 
disability unless the disability continues for longer than two 
consecutive weeks after the date of injury." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-307(l)(b)(i) (1991). (Emphasis added.) 
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Three terms used in that section are critical: (1) the 
loss, (2) disability, and (3) date of injury. Presumably, in 
order to avoid the payment of wage loss benefits for injuries 
which produce a disability lasting three days or less, the 
statute relieves an insurer from paying benefits for the first 
three days of disability unless the disability continues for 
longer than two consecutive weeks following the date of injury.3 
Thus, the "date of the injury" is unquestionably a critical 
moment in the calculation of wage loss benefits. Also, by using 
the date of disability (as opposed to the date of "the loss") to 
compare with the date of injury a distinction has been drawn 
between the date of disability and the date "the loss" occurs. 
Had the legislature intended for the date of "the loss" and the 
date of "the disability" to be identical, there would be no 
reason to use the word disability in the same sentence as the 
3
 Allstate contends that the date of injury and the date of the 
accident must necessarily be the same day. Although every 
manifestation of the injury may not occur until some days after the 
accident, the injury itself, the physiological damage which gives 
rise ultimately to an inability to work, must necessarily occur on 
the date of the accident. Otherwise, the two events would not be 
causally related. In any event, a resolution of that issue is not 
necessary in this case. The record here establishes that at least 
in this case the date of injury and the date of the accident are 
one and the same. As is pointed out in Allstate's statement of 
facts, the insured's primary treating physician stated in his 
letter that the injury occurred on the date of the accident (R. 
00070.) and such statement was set forth in Allstate's uncontested 
facts section of its original memorandum and no opposing statement 
of facts was submitted on that point by the insured. 
15 
term "the loss" is used. The statute could have merely read: 
"This benefit need not be paid for the first three days of the 
loss." Instead of: "This benefit need not be paid for the first 
three days of disability." Thus, the term "the loss" must be 
something different than "the disability". The only other date 
that has meaning in this context (aside from the date of 
disability and the date of injury) is the date of the accident. 
The accident must be what the legislature was referring to when 
it adopted the term "the loss." Therefore, the language of the 
Act mandates payment of wage loss benefits from the date of the 
accident to a date 52 weeks thereafter. That is exactly what 
Larsen received. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing (and Allstate submits, a 
similarly arcane argument made by appellant) the more the bare 
language of the wage loss benefits section, without reference to 
the purpose of th€> Act in general, is analyzed, dissected and 
manipulated, the less clear it becomes. The legislature could 
have used language* that would have clearly and unequivocally 
resolved the issue presented by this appeal. Unfortunately, it 
did not. The Utah Supreme Court has been faced with the problem 
of interpreting similarly imprecise language in the No-Fault Act 
before. In those instances, the Court has consistently eschewed 
a formalized process of dissecting the bare language of the Act 
16 
in favor of looking to the purpose and function of the Act as a 
guiding interpretive reference point• As the Court stated in 
Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Insurance Company, 559 P. 2d 958 (Utah 
1977) : 
We have no hesitancy in agreeing that the 
interpretation and application of the law 
should be a process of reason, as contrasted 
to a mere reading of tables or schedules, nor 
that when controversies arise it is both 
permissible and desirable to look to the 
background and purpose of a statute to 
ascertain its meaning and proper application 
in particular circumstances. 
Id. at 959 (the Court was interpreting the extent of household 
services benefits under the Utah No-Fault Act); see also, Jones 
v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 592 P.2d 609, 611 (Utah 1979) 
(the Court evaluated the wage loss benefits in light of the 
purposes of the Utah No-Fault Act.). 
Likewise in this case, although Allstate considers its 
interpretation of the bare language of the statute to be the most 
accurate among the several less than perfect alternatives, 
Allstate urges the court to interpret the language of the Act in 
light of and influenced by the Act's history and purpose. 
C. The interpretation urged bv Allstate is most consistent 
with the purpose of the Act. 
In Tanner v. Phoenix Insurance Company, 799 P.2d 231 
(Utah App. 1990), this court held that where the Utah No-Fault 
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Act is capable of two meanings as understood by reasonably well 
informed persons, the court must determine the legislature's 
intent in light of the entire statute's purpose and in so doing 
it is appropriate to examine the effect each plausible meaning of 
the statutory language will have "in practical application.11 Id. 
at 233.4 
The Utah Supreme Court has twice set forth the purposes 
of the Utah No-Fault Act and on each occasion has included the 
reduction in the ever increasing cost of insurance, and the 
payment, without undue delay, uncertainties and expenses of 
specified primary damages for necessary medical and hospital 
expense and loss of wages. Jamison, 559 P.2d at 959; Jones, 592 
P.2d at 611. 
4
 Appellant's contention that any reasonable interpretation of 
the statute which expands the level of benefits provided to the 
insured should be preferred over any other reasonable 
interpretation that limits benefits is not supportable. The Utah 
Supreme Court has always resolved questions regarding the 
interpretations of the Utah No-Fault Act by reference to the 
history and purpose of the Act rather than by mechanical adherence 
to whatever result will provide the greatest degree of benefits. 
In fact, the Court has historically preferred interpretations which 
result in more limited benefits when those interpretations further 
the Act's purpose of providing a quick, definitive, but limited 
form of compensation which is intended to supplement, rather than 
replace traditional damages recoverable in a suit brought by the 
injured party. Jamison, 559 P.2d at 959-962; Jones, 592 P.2d at 
611-612. In Jamison, the Court rejected plaintiff's argument which 
relied on a strict interpretation of the bare language of the 
statute in favor of an interpretation which more closely comported 
with the purpose of the statute even though plaintiff's contention 
would have provided more benefits to the insured. Id. at 960. 
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In summary, to interpret the pertinent section of the 
statute, the court should consider the history and purpose of the 
Act, and the practical effect of each of the available 
alternative interpretations. The interpretation that is most 
consistent with the Act's purpose and most practical should be 
favored. See, e.g., Tanner v. Phoenix Insurance Company, 799 
P.2d at 233. 
If appellant's interpretation of the statute is 
accepted, a number of problems will occur which are at odds with 
the statute's purpose and a practical approach to wage loss 
benefits. If as appellate contends an injured party may recover 
wage loss benefits at any time following an injury for a period 
of 52 consecutive weeks after demand is made, insurers will be 
required to maintain an open file on every accident indefinitely 
awaiting the potential of the injured party taking time off work. 
A back injury may result in time off work for the first time ten 
years after the accident and under appellant's interpretation of 
the statute, that injured person could then make a claim against 
an insurer for wage loss benefits for an injury occurring ten 
years ago. At that point it will be impossible for the insurer 
to reconstruct the pertinent facts of the accident, the nature of 
the injury, or to determine whether some intervening circumstance 
occurred to cause the present inability to work. It will be 
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impossible to close the file on any accident where the wage loss 
benefits have not been exhausted and as a result, accurate 
actuarial calculations regarding the cost of potential claims 
will be impossible. An insurer cannot evaluate what future 
premiums should be when potential claims cannot be evaluated. 
Each insurer will be faced with an ever increasing number of 
open-ended potential wage loss claims that might be made at any 
indefinite point in the future. Furthermore, because the Utah 
No-Fault Act provides for the reimbursement of the insurer that 
pays no-fault benefits by the insurer insuring the at-fault 
party, the potential for such reimbursement will last 
indefinitely into the future. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6) 
(1991). Thus, not only will the injured party7s insurer face 
perpetual indefinite liability, so will the tort feasor's 
insurer. 
Such an open ended potential for the payment of wage 
loss claims is at odds with the Act's purpose of providing a 
definite, short term, quick, but limited level of benefits while 
the injured party determines whether to pursue other means of 
recourse and is at odds with the Act's purpose of holding down 
the cost of insurance. The interpretation urged by appellant has 
precisely the opposite effect as that intended by the 
legislature. An endless, expensive, indefinite, administrative 
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nightmare will result if appellant's theory is accepted. Every 
single auto accident in this state (assuming someone involved is 
insured) will result in the creation of potential insurer 
liability for wage loss benefits that will not end until every 
person involved in the accident is dead. The insurance contract 
would remain executory until everyone who might benefit— 
passengers, pedestrians, permissive users—are dead. 
On the other hand, the interpretation urged by Allstate 
will still provide the injured party immediate wage loss benefits 
for an entire year after the accident or injury. During that 
time the injured party can presumably evaluate whether to pursue 
other remedies. The one year wage loss cushion which is provided 
by Allstate's interpretation is entirely consistent with the 
Act's purpose of making sure there are some benefits available 
without undue delay while at the same time keeping the cost of 
insurance down by limiting the duration of such benefits and 
limiting the administrative cost of maintaining an indefinitely 
open file. Furthermore, Allstate's interpretation allows 
investigation of the wage loss claim during a time when memories 
are still fresh and medical treatment is most probably ongoing. 
Thus, Allstate's interpretation strikes a balance between 
providing the required benefits to the injured party and 
efficiently administering the delivery of those benefits on a 
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cost effective basis. Allstate's interpretation does not 
necessarily reduce the benefits available, it merely provides for 
a definite manageable time period within which those benefits can 
be claimed. Allstate submits that such a balance is far more 
consistent with the purposes of the No-Fault Act than the one-
sided and administratively impossible interpretation urged by 
appellant. 
Courts from at least two other jurisdictions have faced 
the precise issue presented by this appeal. Although the 
language of the respective No-Fault Acts varied from that used in 
Utah's No-Fault Act, the reasoning used by those courts in 
concluding that the wage loss benefits run from the date of the 
accident or date of injury, rather than from an indefinite date 
is applicable here. For example, in Glenn v. Farmers and 
Merchants Insurance Company, 649 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D. of Ark. 
1986) the appellant argued that wage loss benefits should begin 
to run from whenever the injured party first takes off work and 
should continue for 52 consecutive weeks thereafter. The 
appellee, the insurance company, argued that such an 
interpretation was impractical and that the only rational 
interpretation was that benefits cease 52 weeks after the date of 
the accident. Id. at 1450. The court rejected the appellant's 
argument on the basis that if carried to its logical conclusion, 
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the insurer's liability for work loss benefits would never end 
until the injured party dies and that benefits might be paid well 
into the next century. The U.S. District Court concluded that 
the Arkansas legislature could not have intended such a result. 
Id. 
Another example is Crieg v. Prudential Property & 
Casualty Company, 686 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1984). Once again, the 
injured party asserted that the Colorado No-Fault Act should be 
interpreted to provide 52 weeks of wage loss benefits beginning 
on the first day that time is taken off work, rather than at the 
date of the injury or accident. The Colorado Supreme Court 
recognized that the Colorado No-Fault Act might be construed to 
be ambiguous and could be interpreted as the injured party 
asserted, but held that the injured party's contention must be 
"analyzed in its immediate textual context and with regard to the 
consequences of any particular construction." Id. at 1335. 
Consistent with that approach, the Colorado Supreme Court 
determined that the Colorado No-Fault Act's purpose of providing 
"minimum coverages for discrete losses over a fixed and 
determinate period of time" would be best served by concluding 
wage loss benefits 52 weeks after the accident instead of an 
indefinite time in the future. Id. 
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The Colorado court noted that any other construction 
places insurers in the impossible position of being liable for 
wage loss benefits in perpetuity: 
Without such limitation, insurers would face 
the prospect of liability in perpetuity for 
work loss benefits. We find nothing in the 
statutory scheme supportive of such a 
construction. 
Id. at 1335. 
Likewise*, nothing in the Utah No-Fault Act indicates a 
desire by the legislature to impose such an onerous burden on 
insurers. Allstate concedes that different statutory language 
was involved in the cases cited, but contends that the same 
rationale which lead the Colorado Supreme Court to resolve an 
ambiguity in the Colorado No-Fault Act in a way consistent with 
that urged by Allstate in this case for very practical reasons, 
and to reject the very interpretation urged by appellant, should 
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also lead this court to the same conclusion.5 The decision of 
the trial court should be affirmed. 
D. Allstate7s policy language. 
If the Court does not find the foregoing argument to be 
persuasive and instead finds that the Act does not provide for a 
certain date upon which the 52 consecutive weeks of wage loss 
benefits begin, then the Court is free to consider the language 
of the insurance contract. See, Farmers Insurance Company v. 
U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 619 P.2d 329, 333 (Utah 1980) 
(where the Court held that allowing the insurance policy to 
control matters that are not addressed in the No-Fault Act struck 
a balance between the Act's stated purposes of reducing the high 
cost of auto insurance and providing a prescribed level of 
benefits.); State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance v. Mastbaum, 748 
P.2d 1042, 1043 (Utah 1987) (the Court cited Farmers Insurance 
5
 At oral argument before the trial court, Larsen argued that 
Utah's six year breach of contract statute of limitation could 
limit wage loss claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. Curiously, 
however, the statute of limitation would actually only extend the 
time within which to make a wage loss claim to a point 6 years 
after the contractual obligation is due, i.e., under Larsen's 
theory when the claimant first takes time off work. Under Larsen's 
theory the breach would not occur until the insurer refused to pay 
benefits and the statute of limitation would begin to run at that 
time. Koulis v. Standard Oil, 746 P. 2d 1182, 1186 (Utah. App. 
1987) . Thus, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 offers no limitation to the 
indefinite liability created by Larsen's theory. 
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Company v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 619 P.2d at 333 
with approval.)* 
The Allstate insurance policy relevant here 
unequivocally and unambiguously limits wage loss benefits to a 
period of 52 consecutive weeks following the date of the bodily 
injury. The specific language provides: 
Allstate will pay to or on behalf of an 
injured person . . . loss of income and loss 
of earning capacity by the injured person 
during his lifetime from inability to work 
during a period commencing three days after 
the date of the bodily injury and continuing 
for a mciximum of 52 consecutive weeks. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
See page 11, PART 2, paragraph 2 of the Allstate policy at R. 
00058. 
Under the clear language of the policy, the benefits 
commence three days after the date of the bodily injury and 
continue for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks. Allstate has 
unambiguously defined the starting point and the ending point of 
benefits. In this case, Allstate paid benefits for 52 weeks 
after the date of bodily injury.6 
Appellant has incorrectly directed the court's 
attention to an entirely different section of the policy and then 
argued that because no duration of benefits provision is set 
6
 Benefits concluded on October 25, 1990, 52 weeks after the 
injury. (R. 00051.) 
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forth there, no duration of benefits provisions exist. 
(Appellant's brief at pages 12-13.) Such an argument hardly 
deserves response in light of the clear language of the policy 
with regard to duration contained in that section of the policy 
which specifically addresses the nature of work loss benefits 
provided. That Allstate did not redefine or reiterate those 
points elsewhere in the policy is irrelevant. Insurers are not 
required to repeat provisions over and over again when the terms 
are clearly set forth initially. 
Appellant also contends that because Allstate's policy 
restricts benefits to wage losses incurred during the injured 
party's "lifetime" that a period longer than 52 weeks after the 
accident is contemplated. (Appellant's brief at pages 14-15.) 
The "during his lifetime" limitation, however, is merely used to 
avoid the payment of benefits after an individual is deceased. 
In other words the "loss of earning capacity" cannot occur as a 
result of death. Thus, the period of benefits is limited in two 
ways: first, the loss of wages must occur while the injured 
party is alive and second it must occur during a period 
"commencing three days after the accident and continuing for . . 
. 52 consecutive weeks." That is what Allstate did in this 
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case.7 The decision of the trial court should therefore, be 
affirmed.8 
POINT II 
ALLSTATE'S POSITION IS "FAIRLY DEBATABLE" 
AND THEREFORE CANNOT SUPPORT AN ACTION 
FOR BAD FAITH 
In Utah, if the position taken by an insurer in denying 
an insured's claim is "fairly debatable", then the insurer has 
met its duty of good faith to its insured. See, Western Casualty 
and Surety Company v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah 1980); 
Hill v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 183 Utah Adv. Rptr. 
7
 It should be noted that although Allstaters policy does not 
require payment of wage loss benefits for the first 3 days after 
the accident, the Act does require payment for the first three 
days. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(1)(b)(i) . Therefore Allstate 
paid benefits according to the requirement of statute instead of 
the policy. (R.00051.) 
8
 Appellant's other arguments—that the date of bodily injury 
and the date of the accident are not defined as being the same date 
under the policy and that ambiguities in the policy must be 
construed in favor of the insured—are irrelevant. First, whether 
the policy defines the date of injury and the date of the accident 
as the same date is unimportant because in this case they did in 
fact occur on the same date. No contrary evidence appears in the 
Record and appellant did not contest that fact below. With regard 
to the resolution of ambiguities, Allstate does not contest 
appellant's statement of the law, however, the policy is simply not 
ambiguous on this point. Payments are paid: "during a period 
commencing three days after the date of bodily injury and 
continuing for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks." 
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70, 73 (Utah App. March 27, 1992); Callioux v. Progressive 
Insurance Company, 745 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah App. 1987). 
Obviously, in this case if this court agrees with 
Allstate's position, then Larsen's claim for bad faith is not 
well taken. 
Even if the court disagrees with Allstate's 
interpretation of the No-Fault statute, Allstate submits that its 
position was still at the very least "fairly debatable". Indeed, 
the district court agreed with Allstate and granted summary 
judgment. Allstate submits that its position is "fairly 
debatable" enough based upon the arguments set forth herein and 
the fact that a district court judge agreed with those arguments 
to preclude a claim for bad faith as a matter of law. 
Additionally, Allstate,s position was supported by the 
uncontroverted affidavit of its lawyer (R. 00072.). The Utah 
Court of Appeals recognized in Callioux, supra, that an experts 
affidavit generally provides a good faith basis for an insurer7s 
defense of a bad faith claim. Callioux, 745 P.2d at 142. In 
this case Allstate had requested and received opinions from its 
counsel to the effect that wage loss benefits begin to run on the 
date of injury, not an indefinite date in the future when the 
injured party first takes time off work. 
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Lastly, Larsen's bad faith claim is beirred because the 
Utah No-Fault Act provides the exclusive remedy to an injured 
party wrongfully denied no-fault benefits. See, Utah Code Ann, 
§ 31A-22-309(5) which provides that: 
If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when 
due, these expenses shall bear interest at 
the rate of 1%% per month after the due date. 
The person entitled to the benefits may bring 
an action in contract to recover the expenses 
plus the applicable interest. If the insurer 
is required by the action to pay any overdue 
benefits and interest, the insurer is also 
required to pay reasonable attorneys' fee to 
the claimant. 
Id. Therefore, instead of Larsen's action for bad faith and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, Larsen is limited 
to recovering interest on the back benefits due and a reasonable 
attorneys' fee. The above quoted remedial section of the Utah 
No-Fault Act is in derogation of the common law and expresses a 
clear legislative intent to supply a limited remedy with regard 
to the limited statutory benefits provided by the No-Fault Act. 
As such, common law remedies such as Larsen's potential bad faith 
claim are preempted. See, Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244, 248 
(Utah App. 1987) cert, denied 765 P. 2d 1277. In Home, the Court 
stated: 
Where a statute is in derogation of the 
common law, and is also remedial in nature, 
the remedial application should be construed 
so as to give effect to its purpose. 
(Citations omitted.) 
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Id. See also, DeFelice Industries Inc. v. Harris, 573 S.2d 643 
(La. App. 1991). As part of the entire statutory no-fault 
benefits scheme, the legislature has provided a specific precise 
remedy in the event that benefits are wrongfully denied. The 
claimant is entitled to interest and attorneys' fees only. No 
mention is made of additional tort damages, and no mention is 
made of the potential for punitive damages. The legislature has 
expressly limited the damages to those articulated, and has, 
therefore, eliminated the uncertainties and vagaries of the law 
of damages pertinent to the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and other insurance bad faith claims. Mr. Larsen's 
damages are clearly provided for and clearly limited and should 
not be expanded beyond the legislative enactment to include 
traditional bad faith damages. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Allstate Insurance Company 
urges the court to affirm the decision of the trial court. 
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